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Introduction Introduction
In this article, we consider the impact of increasingly stringent and complex bank capital regulation on the moral hazard problem attributed to federal deposit insurance. In recent years, in the wake of the savings and loan crisis in the U.S., more stringent and complex capital regulation has been brought to bear upon federally-insured depository institutions.
In 1988, the federal regulatory agencies adopted "risk-based" capital standards governing the ratio of capital to "risk-weighted" assets. These rules replaced simpler requirements pertaining to the ratio of capital to total assets and, in general, were more stringent than the old standards, particularly for larger banks (Avery and Berger 1991) . In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1 Improvement Act (FDICIA) was legislated. One important aspect of the new law was its requirement that the FDIC implement "riskrelated" pricing of deposit insurance. The FDIC responded by basing insurance premia on capital ratios and supervisory risk ratings, whereby banks with lower capital ratios and those assessed by examiners to be more risky pay higher premia. In addition, the so-called prompt corrective action provisions of FDICIA established five capital "zones" ranging from "critically 2
To policymakers and regulators, a potential social cost of bank risk-taking 2 is the possibility that a major bank failure or series of failures could impose external costs on financial markets. See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Berger et. al (1994) for further discussion.
undercapitalized" to "well-capitalized," and required bank regulators to implement progressively tighter restrictions on bank activities as capital declines.
These regulatory initiatives were aimed at discouraging bank risk-taking, preventing bank failures, and ensuring continued solvency of the deposit insurance fund. In large part, this expansion of capital-based regulation was an effort to address a moral hazard problem in banking, widely believed to derive from the federal deposit guarantee. Moral hazard is seen as arising because the government guarantee allows banks to make riskier loans without having to pay higher interest rates on deposits.
As a result, banks may be prone to take on excessive risk. Indeed, there is 2 mounting evidence that moral hazard has been a problem under the current deposit insurance contract; see Berlin, Saunders, and Udell (1991) and references therein.
In this paper, we attempt a dynamic modeling of the moral hazard problem and how it might be affected by various regulatory instruments. The model considers banks which operate in a multiperiod setting with the objective of maximizing the discounted value of their profits. In each period, and based on its capital position, a bank makes a portfolio choice; i.e., it decides how to allocate its assets between risky and safe investments. Then--as a result of the bank's portfolio choice, its pre-existing capital 3
One aspect of such a setting is that the bank will want to remain 3 solvent and generate future profits, and this will partially offset the moralhazard problem that the bank is subject to (wanting to exploit a deposit insurance subsidy.) Keeley (1990) presents empirical findings consistent with the view that the incentive to protect future profits is a moderating influence on bank risk-taking. Of course, the added capital will mitigate the impact of the increased 4 portfolio risk. Nevertheless, the effect of regulatory capital requirements on bank portfolio risk is an important question, because, as emphasized by Berger et al. (1995) , "binding regulatory capital requirements...involve a long-run social tradeoff between the benefits of reducing the risk of negative respond to the imposition of regulatory instruments.
After constructing a theoretical model embodying these features, we calibrate the model using a set of parameter values which come from empirical data on the banking sector during the period 1984-1993. We then numerically solve the model, and apply it to analyze the impact on bank risk-taking of increased capital standards, capital-based premia differentials, and risk-based capital requirements. The model yields a variety of interesting implications in regard to the efficacy of capital-based regulation.
For instance, we find that a premium surcharge imposed on undercapitalized banks worsens the moral hazard problem among these banks, boosting their incentive to take on risk. The underlying intuition is that the premium surcharge cuts into bank earnings, hampering the effort to recapitalize. Thus, the premium surcharge undercuts the ability of an undercapitalized bank to regain a favorable capital position without undertaking substantial risk.
Surprisingly, however, we find that ex-post pricing of risk as represented by the premium surcharge has no appreciable impact on the behavior of a well-capitalized bank.
In the case of a flat (not risk-based) capital requirement, if the capital requirement is raised, then an ex-ante well capitalized bank will take on additional portfolio risk as it adds capital in accordance with the new standard. In most cases, however, an 4 externalities from bank failures and the costs of reducing bank intermediation." To the extent that capital requirements provide incentives for increased risktaking, the tradeoff becomes more severe, since "higher capital will be needed to achieve a given level of safety, thus reducing intermediation." Kahane (1977) , Koehn and Santomero (1980) , Kim and Santomero (1988) , 5 Keeton (1988) , and Gennotte and Pyle (1991) , demonstrate that banks may choose higher-risk portfolios in response to a higher capital requirement. In the models of Kareken and Wallace (1978) , Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Furlong and Keeley (1990) , the deposit insurance subsidy induces a representative bank to hold the riskiest assets available without regard to the minimum capital standard. We consider the dynamics of bank portfolio choice in a multiperiod (infinite horizon) model. Bank size (total assets) is exogenously set at 1. Assets are funded by deposits D and capital C; thus, C+D=1. At the beginning of each period, the bank chooses a portfolio allocation consisting of S units of a safe asset and R units of a risky asset; R+S=1. The cost of deposits is given by the function #(C), where: In any period, the bank's owners (stockholders) earn the residual return on the bank's investments after the bank has paid its depositors, met its fixed expenses, and met the minimum capital requirement. Formally, let z(C,R,u) denote the return net of payments to depositors and fixed expenditures that is implied by a beginning of period capital level C, a portfolio choice R, and a loss realization u:
This assumption is consistent with regulatory requirements mandated by 6 FDICIA, whereby undercapitalized banks are prohibited from paying dividends or paying management fees to a parent holding company. 
Note that u and u are functions of C and R.
A B
In this framework, the bank's optimal investment in the risky asset will depend only on C, the state variable. We denote this optimal investment function R(C). It is determined along with the value function V(C) as the solution to the dynamic programming problem:
where 9 denotes the rate at which stockholders discount future earnings. The maximand in (5) can be understood as follows. The 9 first term represents expected current-period earnings, since stockholders earn z(C,R,u)-C* in the event of a favorable realization u≤u and they earn zero otherwise. The second term B represents the continuation value when the bank meets the capital requirement at the end of the current period, weighted by the probability that this will be the case, and the third term is the expected continuation value when the bank cannot meet the capital requirement (but is still solvent).
0 B 0 we can rewrite (5) in the more amenable form: 
10
The Fortran programs used to compute the solutions discussed below are 7 obtainable from the authors upon request.
The numerical solution to (6) will then be a set of portfolio positions R*(C )≡R and a set of discounted present values i i * V*(C )≡V ,I=1,...,N, such that R solves:
and such that V satisfies (to close approximation):
for each I. Note that u , u , and u in (10) (10) and (11) is straightforward once a probability distribution G(u) is specified and parameter values are assigned. Parameters to be calibrated 7 include: the deposit interest rate # ; the return x on the safe 0 asset; the discount factor 9; operating costs F; the ex ante promised return on the risky asset y ; and the parameters of the 0
11
The results are robust to varying these parameters so long as the net 8 return on the safe asset (return net of deposit and operating costs) remains sufficiently larger than zero. The solutions converge to maximal risk-taking at all capital levels when the net return on the safe asset approaches zero.
Attention is confined to this period because modifications to the Call 9
Reports that were instituted in 1985 introduced certain inconsistencies with earlier years' data. Extreme values were deleted from this panel data set.
Interest expense per dollar of deposits for year [t-1,t] is total deposit 10 interest expenses incurred during the period [t-1,t]; i.e., during the year prior to date t, divided by average total deposits for the reporting dates t-1 and t. specified probability distribution G(u).
Deposit and operating costs and the return on the safe asset.
We assign values to # , x, 9, and F that are consistent with 0 observed data from the banking industry, and hold these constant for the duration of our analysis. The results are robust to varying these parameters within a reasonable range. years, which is used to calibrate # . We employ this two-step 0 procedure in order to avoid placing disproportionate weight on earlier years, since the number of banks in the panel was declining over time.
The empirical estimate we obtain in this way is # =1.048. Similarly, we equate the operating cost parameter F with 0 an "average" bank's operating cost per unit-of-assets to obtain
We first compute the mean, by year, of annual noninterest expenses net 11 of noninterest income divided by total assets (i.e., net noninterest expenses during [t-1,t] divided by average total assets for dates t-1 and t.) We then compute the mean of these means across years.
Thus, a low correlation implies that the performances of individual loans 12 are nearly independent, in which case the pool default rate will be close to the individual default probability d. A higher correlation implies that defaults, when they occur, will tend to occur together.
F=0.02. 11
The return on the model's safe asset, net of per-unit operating costs, is set equal to the average interest rate on 6-month treasury bills over 1985-1993. Since the 6-month t-bill rate averaged 1.06 over 1985 through 1993, we set x=1.06+0.020=1.08.
Finally, we set 9=1/1.06=0.94. Calibration of the loss distribution.
To calibrate the probability distribution of losses on the risky asset, we proceed as follows. We equate investment in the risky asset with investment in a credit portfolio, and then apply a method of simulating portfolio loss distributions developed by McAllister and Mingo (1995) and Jones (1995) . This method involves simulating a sample of 10,000 random rates of return on a hypothetical loan portfolio. An individual borrower's default probability (denoted d) must be specified, along with a "market risk" parameter ( of default is another key parameter.
For further details, see
We adopted the particular approach employed by Jones (1995) , whereby a 13 loan is invested in a project that yields a random return. A default occurs if the return on the project is insufficient to cover the loan repayment; the loss given default is assumed to be a fixed proportion of the loan amount. The contractual interest rate on a loan has a slight impact on the shape of the loss distribution generated by this model, since it affects whether a random return produces a default.
McAllister and Mingo (1995) and Jones (1995) .
13
The loans comprising the model's risky asset are presumed to be riskier than the "typical" bank loan. Such a characterization seems appropriate, as it seems reasonable to draw a distinction between moral hazard and "normal" bank lending activities. Our analysis below experiments with alternative parameter specifications consistent with such a characterization.
Jones ( The severity of loss given default is assumed to be "businesscycle dependent". Specifically, the loss distributions utilized
14
The systemic risk factor s is standard normally distributed. The loss 14 given default is 30 percent of the dollar amount of exposed principal when s 3 0. For s < 0, losses are assumed to increase with -s, up to a maximum loss of .80 for s < -2.0.
A bank's default rate for year [t-1,t] is defined to be the ratio of 15 problem loans (loans 90 days or more past due and non-accruing loans) to total loans, calculated at date t. We compute the mean default rate across banks for each year, and then compute the mean of these means across years, which we take to be the average loan default rate for the panel. A bank's loss rate for year [t-1,t] is defined to be the ratio of net charge-offs (charge-offs minus recoveries) during year [t-1,t] divided by average total loans for the reporting dates t-1 and t. We compute the mean loss rate across banks for each year, and then compute the mean of these means across years, which we take to be the average loss rate for the panel. These distributions rise very slowly through the median and then become progressively steeper, rising sharply through the upper percentiles.
Piecewise linear approximation to the distribution. For the purpose of obtaining numerical solutions to our model, we approximate each generated loan loss distribution by means of a piecewise linear distribution with support [u , u ] , where u =0:
In (12), u ,u ,....u denote, respectively, the 0th, 1st, 5th, 25th, 0 1 8 50th, 75th, 95th, 99th, and 100th percentile of the distribution.
To implement each generated loan loss distribution, we approximate it via appropriate calibration of the parameters u , u in (12). Normally, one would expect a risky asset to provide a higher expected 18 return than a safe asset. In cases corresponding to more extreme moral hazard, however, the risky asset might have an expected return below the return on the safe asset. An example of this is considered below.
Among B-rated private-placement bonds (which tend to exhibit narrower 19 spreads than B-rated publicly-traded bonds), spreads of 800 basis points or more over comparable maturity t-bonds are uncommon, although not so uncommon as to be considered outliers (Carey and Luckner 1995) . Due to the more intensive information production and higher monitoring costs associated with bank loans, however (Carey et. al 1995) , one cannot assume that spreads on risky bank loans would be confined to a similar range.
bank loan spreads to measures of risk are unavailable, however.
Instead, we experiment with various calibrations of y in 0 association with each specified loan loss distribution.
Mostly, we assume that the expected return on the risky asset would exceed the return on the safe asset by a reasonable amount.
18
Consequently, the calibrations we utilize below generally involve spreads of 800 basis points or more between y and the average 6- we hold the minimum capital requirement constant at C*=0.06. Table 3b presents the solution to the model under some additional calibrations of the distribution of returns on the risky asset. For these calibrations, the assumed individual default probability is not held constant but ranges from 0.09 to 0.12, and the promised return y is assumed to increase with the default on activities. Those in zone 2 (adequately capitalized) are subject to increased regulatory scrutiny, including more frequent supervisory exams and prior FDIC approval to accept brokered deposits. Banks in capital zone 3 (undercapitalized) face several mandatory restrictions; for instance, these banks are prohibited from accepting brokered deposits and from paying dividends or management fees, and they are subject to restrictions on asset growth. Those in zone 4 (significantly undercapitalized) are subject to the same restrictions as those in zone 3 plus several additional ones, including restrictions on interaffiliate transactions, on deposit interest rates, and on officer compensation. Banks in capital zone 5 (critically undercapitalized) are subject to still more restrictions, and generally must be placed in receivership or conservatorship within 90 days after being classified as critically undercapitalized. A less severely undercapitalized bank takes on comparatively little risk; its predominant concern is to avoid insolvency or further erosions of capital. For this bank, incremental risktaking has a more significant impact on the probability of (eventual) insolvency, and this bank stands a better chance of regaining a favorable capital position without undertakingsubstantial risk.
A well-capitalized bank can afford to take more risk because it is more remote from bankruptcy. This bank would stand a good chance of recovery should it incur an erosion of capital due to loan losses.
The effects of parameter changes. With an increase in b , the largest 2 potential losses occur with increased probability, but the likelihood that losses will be only small or negligible also increases, and the median loss declines. That is, the loss distribution function becomes more concave; compare, for example, column A with column B in table 2. The first factor (increased probability with respect to the largest potential losses) tends to deter risk-taking by well-capitalized banks. The second factor tends to encourage risk-taking by undercapitalized banks. interest rate provides an incentive to take on more risk, while the increased probability of default provides an opposing incentive.
For a bank that is significantly undercapitalized, the former dominates, because the expected losses associated with the increased probability of default are borne primarily by the deposit insurer rather than by the bank.
Comparing column (I) of table 3b to column (ii) of table 3a,
we see again that increases in y and d lead to an expansion of When the expected return on the risky asset is below the riskfree return, well capitalized banks take on minimum risk; i.e., R*(C*)=0.05. Maximal risk-taking may persist, however, among severely under-capitalized banks. Consider, for instance, the case depicted in column (iv) of table 3b. In this case, the probability of default on an individual loan in the risky asset portfolio is 0.15, and the correlation of loan rates of return is 0.33, implying very high risk. Moreover, the expected return on the risky asset (given the specified y ) is lower than that provided by the safe 0 asset. The range of maximal risk-taking among undercapitalized banks is quite extensive, but at capital levels above this range, minimal risk-taking is the outcome.
Increased Capital Standards and Capital-Based Premia Increased Capital Standards and Capital-Based Premia
To analyze the impact of an increase in the capital requirement, we now solve the model with C*=0.07 in place of C*=0.06. (R*=1.0). The underlying intuition is that the premium surcharge cuts into bank earnings, hampering the effort to recapitalize.
Thus, the premium surcharge undercuts the ability of an undercapitalized bank to regain a favorable capital position without undertaking substantial risk.
This comparison also indicates that introduction of the premium differential has, at best, a slight impact on moderately undercapitalized banks, in the direction of reduced risk-taking.
We observe no impact at all on the behavior a well-capitalized bank; i.e., increasing the premium differential does not appear to have any deterrent effect on risk-taking among well-capitalized banks. This result can be understood as follows. Risk-taking in the model is represented by increased investment in a risky asset.
This asset is characterized by a loss distribution that is highly skewed and has a long tail (it is leptokurtic), so that losses only rarely occur but tend to be very large when they do occur. On the margin, increased investment in such a risky asset has only a slight impact on a bank's probability of becoming undercapitalized.
Consider, for example, the solution depicted in column (I) of table 3a. In this case, a well-capitalized bank invests R*(C*) = 0.55 in the risky asset and with probability F(u )= 0.78792, remains well-B capitalized into the subsequent period. If the bank were to reduce its investment in the risky asset to 0.50, its probability of remaining well-capitalized would rise to 0.79157, an increase of only 0.00365.
Hence, in our model the premium penalty associated with becoming undercapitalized has no appreciable incentive effect on the behavior of well capitalized banks. An open question, which we leave to future research to investigate, is whether a similar result would be obtained if risk-taking were represented as the inclusion of progressively risky types of assets in a portfolio, rather than as incremental units of a given asset.
These results are robust to varying any of the calibrations These would be ranges within which the solution under a flat capital 22 requirement retains something of a "U-shape" (i.e., does not collapse to minimal risk-taking at all capital levels or to maximal risk-taking at all capital levels.)
Primary capital was defined to include equity, loan loss reserves, 23 preferred stock, and various kinds of debentures; see Wall (1989) for details.
within reasonable ranges. The results are also robust to assuming 22 a higher minimum capital standard, or to modifying the size of the assumed premium differential. In sum, the primary effect of an insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks is to substantially aggravate the moral hazard problem among undercapitalized banks, and this implication of the model is highly robust across alternative calibrations.
6. The Impact of Risk-Based Capital Requirements 6. The Impact of Risk-Based Capital Requirements
As noted in the introduction, in 1988 the federal regulatory agencies adopted "risk-based" capital standards that were effectively more stringent than the prior standards, particularly for larger banks (Avery and Berger 1991) . Under the prior standards, primary capital had to be at least 6 percent of total balance sheet assets or the bank would face supervisory action.
23
Under the risk-based standards, differing weights are assigned to various categories of bank assets (e.g. home mortgage loans, treasury bills, commercial loans) prior to summing the assets, to reflect differences in credit risk. The regulations adopted in 1988 required that total capital be at least 8 percent of riskweighted assets (where loan loss reserves were no longer to be fully included as a component of measured capital). In addition,
In addition, the 1988 requlation required banks to hold some capital 24 against off-balance sheet activities. Banks were directed to comply with the new standards by 1992. See Wall (1989) for details.
As noted previously (see footnote 20), FDICIA introduced a distinction 25 between well capitalized and adequately capitalized (as well as three distinct categories of undercapitalized), whereby the latter are subject to closer regulatory scrutiny. Thus, for instance, under current regulations, total capital has to be at least 8 percent of risk-weighted assets for a bank to be considered adquately capitalized, and at least 10 percent of risk-weighted assets for a bank to be considered well capitalized. In addition, there are tests for well capitalized vs. adquately capitalized that are based on tier-one capital in relation to risk-weighted assets and tier-one capital in relation to total assets, resepctively. A bank meeting the three capital ratio tests for the well capitalized category might still be subject to a capital directive requiring it to raise additional capital, based on supervisory assessments of its earnings, asset quality, liquidity, and managerial factors. Any such bank would be classified as adequately capitalized within the prompt corrective action framework. these regulations set standards for tier-one capital (a more restrictive definition of capital) in relation to risk-weighted assets and for tier-one capital in relation to total assets. 24, 25 In this section, we examine the consequences for bank portfolio choice of risk-weighting of assets in computation of regulatory capital. Before we proceed, however, a word of caution is in order. While our model may provide some insight into the effects of a risk-based capital standard, the model is subject to an important limitation. In practice, very broad risk-categories of assets are defined for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital requirements. focus on capital in relation to total assets (the leverage ratio) rather than risk-weighted assets (Peek and Rosengren 1995b, c) .
In sum, banks are subject to a capital rule that depends on their current capital level C and (when C ≥ C ) on the amount of 0 risk the bank undertakes:
(13) C* = 0.06 + n(R -R ) if C ≥ C , C* = 0.06 otherwise. 0 0
To model the impact of such a capital rule on bank risk, we substitute (13) for C* in the dynamic optimization problem (6), which is then solved as follows.
Solution procedure.
As a first step, we solve a related dynamic optimization problem. Let k be a given, non-negative integer and define:
(14) C = 0.06 + (0.002)k; R = R + (C -0.06)/n.
We consider the dynamic optimization problem (6) subject to the constraints:
An intuitive interpretation of these constraints is that the bank commits to a self-imposed "capital target" (C ) which governs k payment of dividends in the same way that a flat, regulatory standard would. This capital target together with a capital rule of the form (13) implies an upper bound (R ) on bank risk-taking. For any given k, computing a numerical solution to this problem is straightforward. Let R*(C, k) denote this solution.
The next step is to solve (6) subject to (15) for all k within
In addition, assume that C > 0.01.
0
Return-on-equity equals 100(1 -9)V(C)/C. Assessing the impact of a risk-based standard. Solving (6) subject to (13) history, its asset quality, or its managerial strengths and weaknesses (Peek and Rosengren 1995a,b,c A well-capitalized bank can afford to take more risk because it is more remote from bankruptcy. It is in a position to be able to recover from a substantial erosion of capital due to loan losses.
In the case of a flat (not risk-based) capital requirement, if the capital requirement is increased, then an ex-ante well capitalized bank will take on additional portfolio risk as it adds capital to comply with the new standard. This is consistent with the overall U-shape of the solution, whereby beyond the lowest capital levels, risk-taking tends to increase with capitalization.
In most cases, however, an increase in the capital standard is found to have little impact on risk-taking behavior among undercapitalized banks. In one exceptional case, involving a very risky asset having an expected return lower than the return on the safe asset, an increased flat capital standard results in expanded risk-taking among significantly undercapitalized banks.
The model has striking implications with respect to the impact of capital-based deposit insurance premia. A primary intent of the Congress in mandating "risk-related" pricing of deposit insurance was to create a disincentive against banks engaging in risky activities. We find, however, that a premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks has a severe impact in the form of a substantial widening of the capital range (among undercapitalized banks) over which maximal risk-taking occurs. Further, ex-post pricing of risk as represented by the premium surcharge has no appreciable impact on the behavior of a well-capitalized bank.
The model suggests that an increased risk-based capital standard is analogous to a higher flat standard, if the risk-based rule is not too stringent. That is, an ex-ante well capitalized bank will respond to the increased standard by raising additional capital and taking on more portfolio risk. If the risk-based rule is sufficiently stringent, however, then raising the standard will have a moderating impact on bank risk-taking. The latter result suggests that risk-based capital requirements are potentially an effective way to curtail moral hazard.
Although significantly undercapitalized banks in our model respond to capital-based insurance premia by increasing the riskiness of their portfolios, it should be noted that the prompt corrective action provisions of FDICIA are intended to promote effective regulatory responses to such behavior. Nevertheless, our 36 model suggests that some of the recent regulatory initiatives could have some unintended consequences. Solutions R*(C) 0<C≤0.008 R*=1.00 R*=1.00 R*=1.00 TABLE 5  TABLE 5 The Impact of a Deposit Insurance Premium Differential: 0<C≤0.004 R*=1.00 R*=1.00 R*=1.00 R*=1.00 TABLE 6  TABLE 6 The Impact of a Risk-Based Capital Standard: 
